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I. INTRODUCTION
The central debate in the field of constitutional law is
whether the Constitution should be interpreted strictly in
accordance with the original public meaning of its text-a form of
originalism known as "original public meaning originalism"-or
whether the courts should adopt a more flexible approach to
interpretation. This more flexible approach could take into
consideration a variety of factors including, for example, the
underlying principles of the Constitution, the intent of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law. The author would like to thank the participants at the 2006
Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and the
Humanities for their helpful comments and suggestions on an early draft of
this Article as well as my fellow members of the Ancient Greek Law panel at
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Framers, contemporary understanding of the text, or the changing
sensibilities, needs and values of American society. For the
purposes of this Article, this more flexible approach shall be
referred to generally as the "living constitution" approach to
interpretation. The phrase "living constitution" has a long history
and has been given a variety of meanings through the years-but
is used here to describe any approach to interpretation that frees
the reader from the strict confines of the Constitution's text and
allows for a reading that preserves the spirit of the law.1 While
this dichotomy between "original meaning originalism" and the
"living constitution" runs the risk of over-simplifying the debate on
how best to interpret the Constitution, it serves the purpose of
setting up the primary tension that animates the debate, namely,
the choice between a text-based approach and an approach that
gives life to the underlying principles, or spirit, of the document.
The debate over originalism has not only divided academics,
but has become an inflammatory political issue. Republican
candidates swear to appoint only originalist judges (and often
deride non-originalist judges as "activists" that threaten to
override the will of the legislature), while Democrats reject
originalism with equal passion, regarding its adherents as rigid
formalists who are insensitive to modern realities.2 The most
1. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L.
REV. 693, 693 (1976). Justice William Rehnquist has noted that the phrase
'living constitution' has about it a teasing imprecision that makes it a coat of
many colors." Id. In his article, Rehnquist identifies two manifestations of the
"living constitution" approach-one manifestation views the Constitution as
drafted in general language that succeeding generations are free to interpret
and apply according to modern needs, while the other manifestation believes
that the Supreme Court Justices have the power to, in effect, amend the
Constitution by reading their own values into the document. Id. at 694-95.
Regarding the meaning of "living constitution" see also Scott Dodson, A
Darwinist View of the Living Constitution, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1319, 1322-23 &
n.6 (2008).
2. See, e.g., John McCain, Senator and then Republican Presidential
Candidate, Remarks on Judicial Philosophy at Wake Forest University (May
6, 2008) (transcript available at http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-
news/2012562/posts)
With a presumption that would have amazed the framers of our
Constitution, and legal reasoning that would have mystified them,
federal judges today issue rulings and opinions on policy questions that
should be decided democratically. Assured of lifetime tenures, these
judges show little regard for the authority of the president, the
Congress, and the states. They display even less interest in the will of
the people.
Id. Likewise, in a campaign appearance in Westerville, Ohio on March 2,
2008, Barack Obama, then Democratic candidate for the presidency, made
clear that he supported the appointment of judges in the tradition of former
Chief Justice Earl Warren-and then subtly insinuated that originalists are
unsympathetic to the needs of the citizens by saying that he "want[ed] people
on the bench who have enough empathy, enough feeling, for what ordinary
[42:463
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contentious debates about the merits of originalism take place in
the chambers of the Supreme Court where Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Roberts, and Alito press for an originalist interpretation
of the Constitution-and do so with increasing success-while the
other five justices generally take a more flexible approach to
interpretation. The originalism debate was thrown into high relief
in the recent case of District of Columbia v. Heller where the Court
addressed the controversial issue of whether the Second
Amendment creates an individual right to bear arms.3 In Heller, a
majority of the Court joined Justice Scalia in his originalist
interpretation of the Amendment, thus indicating a renewed
ascendancy of the theory. This case highlights the Supreme
Court's shift away from the more liberal approach to constitutional
interpretation that was espoused by the Warren and Burger courts
and which resulted in several landmark decisions expanding the
scope of civil liberties. Despite the current ascendancy of
originalism, the debate regarding the proper approach to
constitutional interpretation will undoubtedly continue to be the
central question of constitutional law.
This Article provides a fresh perspective on the originalism
debate by undertaking a comparative study of constitutional
interpretation in the United States and ancient Athens. By
observing how the ancient Athenians resolved the same
interpretational problems that face the Supreme Court today, we
are able to gain a better understanding of the issues that drive the
originalism debate. This Article will focus on Athenian practice in
350 B.C., which falls late in the history of the Athenian
democracy, well after the legal system had achieved its final form.
4
This was also the year in which Aristotle published the
Constitution of the Athenians, which provides extraordinary detail
about the nature of the Athenian government and legal system as
it existed at that time.5
people are going through." Michael Powell, Strong Words in Ohio as Obama
and Clinton Press On, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2008, at A16.
3. D.C. v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2787-88 (2008).
4. See Mark J. Sundahl, The Rule of Law and the Nature of the Fourth-
Century Athenian Democracy, 54 CLASSICA ET MEDIAEVALIA 127, 127-32
(2003) (explaining some of the more important legal reforms enacted by the
Athenians to strengthen the rule of law in Athens). To provide some historical
orientation, 350 B.C. falls some 130 years after the Athenians defeated the
Persians at Salamis-a victory that resulted in Athens' military supremacy in
Greece-and some forty-nine years after the execution of Socrates in 399 B.C.
See generally RAPHAEL SEALEY, A HISTORY OF THE GREEK CITY STATES 700-
338 B.C. (1976).
5. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS (Stephen
Everson trans., Cambridge University Press 1996). Whether The Constitution
of the Athenians is an authentic work of Aristotle, or was written by one of his
students, has been subject to debate. Id. at xii.
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The many similarities between ancient Athens and the
United States make Athens a suitable subject for a comparative
analysis of this type. Although not directly modeled on Athens,
the American government and legal system share many features
of the Athenian democracy, such as the separation of powers
between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches; a written
constitution; judicial review; the right to a trial by jury; and, most
importantly, the fundamental democratic concept of "one man, one
vote."6 Athens also shares a similar historical arc with the United
States marked by a meteoric rise from a relatively minor
population center to a world power.7
During the 299 years of Athenian history, stretching from the
enactment of their first written laws in 621 B.C. to their loss of
independence to the Macedonians in 322 B.C., Athens transformed
from an undistinguished aristocracy suffering from deep social
tensions to a vibrant democracy that controlled an empire.8 In the
course of this spectacular growth, Athens acquired great wealth,
became a hub of international trade, and emerged as the
intellectual center of the Mediterranean.9 At the same time,
Athens underwent one of the most profound cultural revolutions in
history due to the influence of a new breed of philosophers and
sophists who brought about an era of rapidly changing societal
values. 10 In the 220 years that have elapsed since the ratification
of the United States Constitution, The United States has
undergone a similar transformation-growing from a young nation
to the world's sole superpower. Like Athens, the United States'
growth in wealth and power has been accompanied by significant
changes in popular culture and values.
In both Athens and the United States, questions of
constitutional interpretation arise in the context of the judicial
review of new legislation. Like the United States, Athens had a
6. See generally DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 85-94 (2008) (illustrating that the Framers
clearly took examples of ancient democracies into account as evidenced by
frequent references to antiquity in the Federalist Papers and other writings).
However, the Framers also harshly criticized certain aspects of the ancient
forms of government. For example, Alexander Hamilton wrote:
It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and
Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions
with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession
of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration
between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 71-72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
7. See generally SEALEY, supra note 4, at 238-321.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. ROBIN WATERFIELD, ATHENS, FROM ANCIENT IDEAL TO MODERN CITY: A
HISTORY 130-35 (2004).
[42:463
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strong tradition of judicial review. Several of the Athenian
courtroom speeches delivered in actions for unconstitutionality
have been preserved to the present day. These speeches provide
valuable evidence, which will be analyzed in this Article, about
how the Athenians approached the same fundamental question
that faces the members of the Supreme Court: Should the
constitution be read narrowly in accordance with its original
meaning or should the courts interpret the constitution in a
manner that implements its underlying principles and purpose
without being constrained unduly by the text? In the end, this
Article shows that the Athenians had a surprisingly flexible "living
constitution" that protected the underlying principles of the
constitution and accommodated the changing needs of a society
that, like the United States, evolved in breathtaking ways over the
course of hundreds of years.
The following section launches this comparative analysis by
describing the contours of the originalism debate in the United
States. Part III then shifts the focus of the Article to ancient
Athens and provides, for background purposes, a sketch of the
Athenian government and legal system. Part IV forms the core of
the Article and explores how Athens developed a living
constitution that resulted from the "open texture" of its legal
system coupled with an approach to interpretation that protected
the fundamental underlying principles of the Athenian
constitution. Finally, Part V discusses the lessons that can be
drawn from the Athenian example.
II. THE MODERN DEBATE: ORIGINALISM VS. A LIVING CONSTITUTION
The modern debate regarding the merits of originalism as a
method of constitutional interpretation has been traced back to
two seminal articles that appeared in the 1970s: Robert Bork's
1971 article Neutral Principles and some First Amendment
Problems" and Justice William Rehnquist's 1976 article The
Notion of a Living Constitution.1 2  However, the originalism
11. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
12. Rehnquist, supra note 1; see also RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY THE
JUDICIARY (1977) (providing additional insight into the growing originalism
movement of the 1970s); Lawrence B. Solum, The District of Columbia v.
Heller and Originalism 3, (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No.
08-14, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1241655 (describing the
originalism debate prior to the 1970s). Of course, the use of the Framers'
understanding and intent for purposes of interpretation is not a recent
invention, but arose in the very earliest years of the republic. The Supreme
Court first referred to the intent of the Framers in the 1798 case of Calder v.
Bull. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798):
The celebrated and judicious Sir William Blackstone, in his
commentaries, considers an ex post facto law precisely in the same light
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movement entered the political arena and received greater public
attention in 1985 when former Attorney General Edwin Meese
delivered a series of speeches in which he called for a "return to
the jurisprudence of original intention" in the wake of Roe v. Wade
and other Supreme Court decisions that were based, in Meese's
opinion, on an intolerably loose reading of the Constitution. 13 That
same year, H. Jefferson Powell published his seminal work, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, which posited that the
Framers expected the Constitution to be interpreted just as a
statute would be interpreted under the common law-according to
the meaning of its words from the perspective of a modern reader
(rather than pursuant to an historically reconstructed original
meaning), thus giving new support to the argument for a living
constitution.14 A flood of scholarship soon followed regarding the
role of the Framers' intent in the interpretation of the
Constitution.15
The originalist approach continued to evolve over the years.
In the 1980's and 1990's, originalists were primarily concerned
with interpreting the Constitution in accordance with the original
intent of the Framers.16 However, the methodological difficulties
of determining intent led to a shift of focus from original intent to
the original meaning of the text as understood by the public at the
I have done. His opinion is confirmed by his successor, Mr. Wooddeson;
and by the author of the Federalist, who I esteem superior to both, for his
extensive and accurate knowledge of the true principles of Government.
Id. (emphasis added). The Federalist Papers were mentioned even earlier in
litigants' briefs before the Supreme Court as a guide to the meaning of the
Constitution. See Commonw. v. Schaffer, 4 U.S. 26 (1797); Penhallow v.
Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. 54 (1795); see also Ira C. Lupu, Time, the Supreme
Court, and The Federalist, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1324 (1998) (examining the
Supreme Court's references to the Federalist Papers); Raoul Berger, "Original
Intention" in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296 (1986)
(discussing the earliest evidence regarding the use of original intent in
constitutional interpretation).
13. Murray Dry, Federalism and the Constitution: The Founders' Design
and Contemporary Constitutional Law, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 233, 233-34
(1987).
14. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885, 895-96 (1985).
15. Larry Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can the
Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482 (1985); Raoul
Berger, The Activist Flight from the Constitution, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1986);
RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDER'S DESIGN (1987); J. Jefferson
Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987); Edwin Meese,
Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 5
(1988); Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of
History, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911 (1988); LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND
THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1989).
16. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 519, 553-54 (2003).
[42:463
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time of ratification. 17  Today, the primary contention of
originalists, in the strain of Justice Scalia, is that the majoritarian
nature of the American democracy demands that judges adhere to
the original meaning of the Constitution's text as it was
understood by the voting public at the time of its ratification.
Justice Scalia, who is among the most influential proponents of
originalism, describes his "original public meaning" approach to
constitutional interpretation in the following manner: "What I look
for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute; the
original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen
intended."1 8 Underlying this majoritarian theory is the idea that
the sovereign power of the United States resides in the majority
vote of the citizenry and that this sovereignty is violated when
judges veer from the meaning that the people had adopted and
consented to when ratifying the Constitution in the eighteenth
century.1 9 Originalists also assert that originalism offers the only
method of ensuring that the integrity of the law is shielded from
the ever-changing sensibilities of the bench.20 Any other approach,
they argue, would result in a chaotic range of interpretations that
flow from the variable values of different judges at different
times. 21
On the other side of the originalism debate are the non-
originalists, who promote the "living constitution" approach, which
places far greater emphasis on the underlying principles of the
Constitution in questions of interpretation, rather than focusing
narrowly on the meaning of the black-letter language. 22
17. Id. Justice Scalia was instrumental in initiating this shift. Id. at 554-
55; see also Solum, supra note 12, at 3-15 (providing a far more nuanced
description of the evolution of originalism and its different schools).
18. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role
of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in
A MArTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 3, 38 (Antonin
Scalia & Amy Gutmann, eds., 1998).
19. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1098 (1989) (explaining that, pursuant to the
majoritarianism argument, "[i]f judges get their authority from the
Constitution, and the Constitution gets its authority from the majority vote of
the ratifiers, then the role of the judge is to carry out the will of the ratifiers.").
20. Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted"
Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 19-20 (2006) (pointing out that "because the
underlying principles are not themselves in writing and are often far from
incontestable, the principles may simply represent the preference of whoever
is doing the 'interpreting."').
21. Id.
22. Id. at 19. Professor Randy Barnett, although himself an avowed
originalist, provides a concise description of the "underlying principles"
approach. Barnett explains that, "[adherents of the "underlying principles"
approach] discern from the text the deeper underlying principles that underlie
its particular injunctions .. . [and] then appeal to these underlying principles
to limit the scope of the text or ignore it altogether." Id.; see also Terrance
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Proponents of a living constitution view originalism as a rigid and
formalistic approach to constitutional interpretation that prevents
the Constitution from fulfilling its intended purpose as a "living
and breathing" document that was meant to evolve with changing
times. 23 This flexibility, they argue, is necessary in order for the
Constitution to continue to survive over centuries of change in the
political, economic, and social landscape. 24 They also argue that
the Framers themselves rejected originalism and intended the
Constitution to be interpreted in accordance with the changing
nature of society. 25 To these objections, opponents of originalism
add that it is simply wrong for citizens today to be bound by
eighteenth-century interpretations of the law and, in effect, be
ruled by the "dead hand" of the past.26
The living constitution approach has led to some of the most
significant Supreme Court decisions in recent history. Perhaps
the best known is Brown v. Board of Education where the Court
held that segregation in public schools was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 It is widely
accepted that the decision in Brown could not be supported by the
plain language of the Constitution and could only be achieved by
way of a living constitution approach that would give the Justices
sufficient latitude to interpret "equal protection" broadly in light of
the harsh realities of segregation.2 But Brown was not the only
civil rights case that relied on a living constitution approach to
interpretation. For example, in the 1925 case of Gitlow v. New
York, the Court held that the Bill of Rights implicitly limits the
Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1039 (1981)
(explaining that the United States has a living constitution that gives
expression to current values).
23. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Respondent: The Limits of Empirical Political
Science and the Possibilities of Living-Constitution Theory for a Retrospective
on the Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 737, 742 (2003) (explaining that
the Constitution serves as a "legal transmitter" for the American people's
changing understanding of fundamental law).
24. Id.
25. Powell, supra note 14, at 895-96. Alternative views regarding
interpretation did exist among the Framers. For example, Madison thought
that the meaning of the Constitution could at times be clarified by reference to
the legislative histories of the ratifying conventions. Id. at 932; see also Jack
N. Rakove, The Original Intention of Original Understanding, 13 CONST.
COMMENT. 159, 160 (1996) (explaining that Madison "affirmed that evidence
of what the Constitution meant to its legal ratifiers in the state conventions
was pertinent").
26. Barnett, supra note 20, at 8; see also Michael J. Kiarman, Antifidelity,
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 382 (1997) (describing some problems in the logic of
originalism as a method of interpreting the Constitution).
27. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
28. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT
OF JUSTICE 110 (1998).
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powers of state, as well as federal, government. 29 Similarly, in
Katz v. United States, the Court held that the language of the
Fourth Amendment, protecting citizens against "unreasonable
searches and seizures," should be read broadly to apply not only to
searches of physical belongings of the type that were common at
the time of ratification, but also to modern techniques of electronic
surveillance. 30
Perhaps the most controversial Supreme Court decision
applying the living constitution approach was Roe v. Wade, where
the Court held that a Texas law criminalizing abortion violated a
constitution right to privacy. 31 In Roe, the Court admits that
"[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of
privacy," but then proceeds to recognize a right of privacy that
emanates, from the Roe Court's perspective, primarily from "the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action," but also from the First, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, as well as from the "penumbras of
the Bill of Rights."32
Roe was not decided in a vacuum, but came at the end of a
line of cases that had held that the Constitution contains a right of
privacy that emanates from the different constitutional provisions
just mentioned. For purposes of illustrating how this implied right
of privacy has come to be recognized by the Supreme Court, the
case of Griswold v. State of Connecticut provides perhaps the best
example. 33 In Griswold, the Court held that Connecticut's law
criminalizing the use of contraceptives was unconstitutional on the
grounds that it violated an individual's constitutional right to
privacy. 34 In support of its decision, the Court famously stated
"that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance" and that these "[v]arious guarantees create
zones of privacy" that cannot be violated.35 For example, the Court
explained how the First Amendment rights to free speech and
assembly have a penumbra of implied rights, including the right to
free association, that are "necessary in making the express
29. Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); see also William P. Gray, Jr.,
'We the People" or 'We the Judges" A Reply to Robert R. Baugh's Response, 49
ALA. L. REv. 607, 607-08 (1998) (discussing how the Supreme court "invented
the theory-by assumption only-that the Bill of Rights limits the states as
well as the federal government").
30. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
31. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
32. Id. at 152-53; see generally John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (critiquing the reasoning of
Roe v. Wade).
33. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34. Id. at 485-86.
35. Id. at 484.
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guarantees fully meaningful."36 The Court found other "facets" of
privacy in the Third Amendment, which creates a zone of privacy
by prohibiting the quartering of soldiers in homes; in the Fourth
Amendment, which creates a zone of privacy by prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures; and in the Fifth Amendment,
which creates a zone of privacy by allowing a defendant to remain
silent to avoid self-incrimination.37 In these repeated protections
of personal privacy, the Griswold Court identified a general
underlying principle that citizens should be protected from
governmental intrusions into their privacy-a principle that the
Court believed was violated by the Connecticut statute
criminalizing the use of contraceptives. The Griswold case shows
how the Supreme Court was able to extract a fundamental
underlying principle that was repeatedly expressed in the
Constitution, although never in a general manner, and give that
principle life.
Despite the long run of distinguished decisions influenced by
the concept of a living constitution, the tide is turning. As seen
recently in Heller, the originalists now appear to be gaining
ascendancy in the Supreme Court with the addition of Justices
Roberts and Alito-who now typically join Scalia, Thomas, and, at
times, Kennedy to form a majority. Justice Scalia's majority
opinion in Heller, joined by Justices Roberts, Alito, Thomas, and
Kennedy, focuses on the text of the Second Amendment, in which
Justice Scalia sees an unqualified individual right to own guns.38
The majority's reliance on the "original meaning" of the Second
Amendment is clearly set out early in the opinion:
In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that "[t]he
Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words
and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as
distinguished from technical meaning. 39
After finding that the opening clause of the Second
Amendment does not limit the "operative clause" of the
amendment, Scalia undertook a lengthy investigation into the
historical meaning of "to keep and bear arms." He concluded that
the phrase would have been understood originally as guaranteeing
an individual right to keep and bear arms, rather than a right to
bear arms only as part of a militia.40
36. Id. at 482-83.
37. Id. at 484.
38. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2792.
39. Id. at 2788; see also Randy Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution
Means What it Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13 (describing Justice
Scalia's opinion in Heller as "the finest example of what is now called 'original
public meaning' jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court").
40. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797. Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent
(joined by Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer) is also focused primarily on the text
[42:463
HeinOnline  -- 42 J. Marshall L. Rev. 472 2008-2009
2009] A Comparative Perspective on the Originalism Debate 473
Even the most stalwart proponents of originalism admit that
the theory suffers from certain defects that render it an imperfect
method of interpretation. For example, most would agree that
originalism relies on the reader's ability to determine the original
meaning of the Constitution and that determining this meaning
can prove to be a difficult, if not an impossible, task due to two
fundamental problems. First, determining the commonly
understood meaning of a constitutional clause in the eighteenth
century requires a rigorous historical investigation that most
judges do not have the time, resources, or desire to undertake. 41
Second, even the most rigorous historical inquiry may still produce
an ambiguous result due to multiple meanings that certain words
may have carried in the eighteenth century. An example of this
can be found in Heller where both Justices Scalia, in the majority
opinion, and Stevens, in his dissent, undertook a historical inquiry
into the meaning of the phrase "to bear arms" as it was understood
in the eighteenth century, but reached different conclusions. On
the one hand, Justice Scalia argued that "to bear arms" simply
meant "to carry a gun" whether or not it was in the context of
military service.42 On the other hand, Justice Stevens comes to
the conclusion that "to bear arms" always referred to carrying a
gun for military purposes. 43
of the Second Amendment, but Stevens' interpretation of the text is guided by
his understanding of the intent of the Framers which he believes was to limit
the right to bear arms in the context of a well regulated militia, as is
suggested by the amendment's prefatory clause. Stevens' reliance on the
Framers' intent when interpreting the amendment is perhaps most clearly
reflected in his statement that "the Framers' single-minded focus in crafting
the constitutional guarantee 'to keep and bear arms' was on military uses of
firearms, which they viewed in the context of service in state militias." Id. at
2826 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Of the three opinions written in Heller, Justice
Stephen Breyer's dissent (joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg) comes
perhaps closest to embracing the "living constitution" approach by allowing his
decision to be guided primarily by the purpose of the law and the interests of
modern Americans, rather than the language of the law (with which he shows
little interest). Id. at 2847-70. Justice Stevens argues that the Constitution
grants an individual right to bear arms only in connection with service in a
state militia on the grounds that the clear purpose of the amendment, "[a]s
evidenced by its preamble," was "to assure the continuation and render
possible the effectiveness of [militia] forces" Id. at 2847-48. However, the
bulk of Breyer's opinion makes the argument for the need for an interest-
analysis (taking into account among other things the risk of accidental deaths,
suicide and domestic violence) to be carried out when determining the
constitutionality of gun-control laws. Id. at 2851-70.
41. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849,
856 (1989) (admitting that it can be "exceedingly difficult to plumb the original
understanding of an ancient text.").
42. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789.
43. Id. at 2790 (discussing Justice Stevens' dissent).
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Justice Scalia himself has acknowledged that originalism,
when applied in its pure form, is problematic because it may at
times lead to results that would be a "too bitter a pill" for the
American public to swallow in those cases where an originalist
interpretation offends modern values or results in overturning
long-standing precedent. 44 In light of this, Justice Scalia admits
that he himself also has a tendency to follow a "faint-hearted"
originalism that is tempered by a respect for precedent under the
principle of stare decisis.45 Despite its inherent flaws, proponents
of originalism continue to promote the method as the best
available technique-or, as Justice Scalia puts it, as "the lesser
evil" when compared with other non-originalist methods of
interpretation. 46  On the other hand, non-originalists would
respond that there is no need to choose one method over another.
It is far better, they would argue, to take into account a full range
of factors when deciding how best to apply the Constitution,
including precedent, doctrine, and contemporary social values-as
well as the original meaning of the text.47
III. A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE ATHENIAN GOVERNMENT AND LEGAL
SYSTEM
We now shift our focus from modern America to ancient
Athens to explore how the Athenians resolved questions of
constitutional interpretation. In order to provide the reader with
some essential background, this section describes the Athenian
government and legal system, including its process of judicial
review.
44. Scalia, supra note 41, at 861.
45. See id. at 864 (confessing that "in a crunch [he] may prove a faint-
hearted originalist."). Even in Heller, Justice Scalia tempers his originalist
approach when he supports his argument for the individual right to bear arms
by taking into account the modern preference for handguns as the weapon of
choice for self-defense. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818.
46. Scalia, supra note 41 at 862.
47. Farber, supra note 19, at 1105. Precedent is the practice of abiding by
prior decisions, while doctrine is a rational framework of ideas that emerges
from prior decisions, as well as, from the writings of commentators. Charles
Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1140, 1141-42 (1994); see
also Gary S. Lawson, An Interpretivist Agenda, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
157, 161 (1992) (discussing whether the judiciary has the right to adhere to
precedent rather than reach a decision on the basis of doctrine). Contra Akhil
R. Amar, On Lawson on Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLy 39, 39-43
(1994) (criticizing Lawson's analyis). See generally Anthony T. Kronman,
Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990) (discussing the similarities
and differences between precedent and philosophy).
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A. The Sources
Our understanding of the Athenian government and legal
system is derived from the limited amount of evidence that has
survived the 2,400-year span that separates us from classical
Athens. The primary source of evidence is The Constitution of the
Athenians by Aristotle, which provides a detailed explanation of
the evolution of the Athenian democracy and also describes the
structure of the government and legal system as it stood in 350
B.C. An equally illuminating source of information about the
Athenian legal system is found in the corpus of 106 speeches that
were delivered in the Athenian courtrooms by litigants and were
later transmitted to us through the efforts of medieval scribes, or
were preserved on ancient papyrus in the sands of Egypt.4s The
authors of these surviving speeches are the ten canonical Attic
Orators: Aeschines, Andocides, Antiphon, Demades, Demosthenes,
Hypereides, Isaeus, Isocrates, Lycurgus, and Lysias. Admittedly,
the number of surviving speeches is a small fraction of the total
number of speeches that were delivered during the fourth century,
when the Athenians were holding perhaps as many as 2,400 trials
a year. 49 Moreover, since most of the extant speeches were written
by either Demosthenes or Lysias (and all of them were written by
expert speechwriters), the speeches may not be representative of
the typical speech delivered in an Athenian courtroom.
Nevertheless, the speeches provide a rich source of information
regarding the substance, procedure, and rhetoric of Athenian law
that allows us to reconstruct the Athenian legal system with a
respectable degree of certainty.
The aforementioned sources are further supplemented by
legal inscriptions as well as the writings of historians,
playwrights, and poets, who occasionally shed light on the nature
of the democracy and legal system. Despite the existence of an
Athenian public program dedicated to the inscription of all extant
statutes, only eleven statutes inscribed in stone have survived to
the present day.50  However, these few inscriptions provide
48. See, e.g., DAVID WHITEHEAD, HYPEREIDES: THE FORENSIC SPEECHES 27
(Oxford University Press 2000) (noting how the six speeches of Hypereides
have come down to us (some only in fragments) on a single sheet of Egyptian
papyrus acquired by the British Museum in 1890). Fragments of two
previously unknown speeches by Hypereides were discovered in 2002 in the
pages of the Archimedes Palimpset. Felicia R. Lee, A Layered Look Reveals
Ancient Greek Texts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2006, at El.
49. See ALAN L. BOEGEHOLD, THE LAWCOURTS AT ATHENS: SITES,
BUILDINGS, EQUIPMENT, PROCEDURE, AND TESTIMONIA 30, 36 (1995)
(calculating 2,400 trials per year based on the assumption of 200 court days
during which three trials were held in each of the four courtrooms contained
in the fourth-century Square Peristyle courthouse).
50. RONALD STROUD, THE ATHENIAN GRAIN-TAX LAW OF 374/3 B.C. 15-16
(1998). The eleven surviving classical Athenian inscriptions of statutes are:
20091
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invaluable evidence about the Athenian legal system by providing
reliable evidence about the wording of some important Athenian
statutes, such as Drakon's homicide laws. In an example of how
ancient authors can help to illuminate the operations of the
democracy, the historian Xenophon describes, in his Hellenica, the
so-called "Arginousae Affair." The Arginousae Affair was a
notorious event in Athenian history when a number of Athenian
generals were summarily sentenced to death for malfeasance
without trial, an incident which is traditionally viewed as the
nadir of the radical Athenian democracy.51 On the comic side,
Aristophanes' play, The Wasps, satirizes the litigiousness of the
Athenian people and reveals much about the Athenian jury
system.52 Similarly, the great legislator Solon tells us in his own
poetry about the political reforms that he enacted. In fact, much
of what we know about his accomplishments comes from his own
poetry.53
(1) Drakon's homicide laws; (2) the law on the naval trierarchy; (3) the law on
silver coinage; (4) the grain tax law; (5) a law concerning public finance; (6) the
law on Eleusinian first-fruits; (7) the law on the reconstruction of the walls; (8)
the law against tyranny; (9) the law on the Lesser Panathenaic Festival; (10) a
law concerning offerings; and (11) the law regarding the sanctuary of Artemis
at Brauron. Id.
51. XENOPHON, HELLENICA, BOOKS I-V, 73 (Charlton L. Brownson trans.,
Loeb Classical Library 1961). Xenophon tells us that when, in the course of
the debate, Euryptolemos threatened to challenge the legality of the proposal
to execute the generals, a group of citizens violently protested that "it was
monstrous if the people were to be prevented from doing whatever they
wished." Id. (Xen.Hell.1.7.12) (emphasis added); see also MARTIN OSTWALD,
FROM POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LAW: LAW, SOCIETY,
AND POLITICS IN FIFTH-CENTURY ATHENS 431-445 (1986) (describing in detail
the Arginousae Affair).
When appropriate, citations to ancient texts are followed in parentheses
by the standard reference used by classical legal historians. These citations
indicate the author, the particular speech in that author's corpus, and the
paragraph in that speech. For example, Dem. 18.36 refers to the thirty-sixth
paragraph in the eighteenth speech in Demosthenes' corpus. The
abbreviations used for the Attic orators and other relevant authors are as
follows: Aeschines (Aeschin.), Andocides (And.), Antiphon (Ant.), Aristotle
(Ar.), Aristophanes (Arist.), Demades (Demad.), Demosthenes (Dem.),
Dinarchus (Din.), Hypereides (Hyp.), Isaeus (Is.), Isocrates (Isoc.), Lysias
(Lys.), and Xenophon (Xen.).
52. ARISTOPHANES, THE ACHARNIANS, THE CLOUDS, THE KNIGHTS, THE
WASPS 213 (Benjamin B. Rogers trans., Loeb Classical Library 2003).
53. For example, in one of his poems Solon predicts that his new laws will
cure Athens of its ailments:
[My law] takes crooked judgments and makes them straight,
Calms arrogant deeds, stops seditious acts,
And ends the anger of troublesome strife. And so under it,
Everything for mankind becomes just and wise.
1 ELEGY AND IAMBUS 120 (J. M. Edmonds trans., Loeb Classical Library
1968).
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B. The Organs of Government in Athens
The Athenian government was composed of four organs: the
Assembly, the Council, the magistrates, and the courts. Although
the analogy is not perfect, this constellation of organs resembles
the tripartite separation of powers that is found in the United
States. The Assembly was the legislative branch (with the Council
serving as a sort of lower house), while the courts and magistrates
served as the judicial and executive branches, respectively. That
being said, the nature and relationship of the branches differed
significantly from their analogs in the United States. The most
notable difference is that the United States has a representative,
rather than a direct, democracy. Moreover, no single Athenian
magistrate was nearly as powerful as the American president.
And the separation of powers between the legislature and the
courts in Athens was rather weak due to the fact that the jurors in
court were drawn from the same body of citizens who populated
the Assembly.5 4 This meant that an Athenian citizen might very
well vote to enact a law in the Assembly on one day and soon
thereafter sit on the jury that to decide the constitutionality of
that same law. The following paragraphs provide a concise
overview of each of the four organs of the Athenian government.
1. The Assembly
The central organ of the Athenian democracy was the popular
Assembly, or ekklesia, which held the legislative power in Athens
(together with a college of lawgivers, or nomothetai).55  The
Assembly was composed of all adult male citizens who voted by
hand to approve or reject the proposals that were put before
them.56 The Assembly issued two types of legislation: statutes
(nomoi) and decrees (psephismata). The most salient distinction
between these types of legislation was procedural: decrees were
passed merely by a majority vote of the Assembly, while statutes
were subjected to a slightly more rigorous procedure prior to
enactment, as explained below. Decrees were also distinct from
statutes with respect to subject matter, in that they addressed
specific issues of a temporary nature and lost their force as soon as
their purpose was served. 57 In contrast, statutes were permanent
rules of a general nature that were not restricted to any particular
event.58
54. Sundahl, supra note 4, 132-37.
55. MOGENS HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF
DEMOSTHENES 155-56, 165-66 (J.A. Crook trans., 1991).
56. Id. at 129.
57. Id. at 171.
58. Id.
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Prior to 403 B.C., statutes were enacted by the simple vote of
the Assembly, thus giving the Assembly tremendous unchecked
power to legislate. 59 However, new legislative procedures enacted
in 403 B.C. required that statutes be ratified by a college of 1001
citizens, known as the nomothetai.60 Although new statutes were
still proposed and debated in the Assembly, no statute passed into
force until it was reviewed and approved by the nomothetai.61 This
review took the form of a trial in which the nomothetai,
functioning as a type of jury, listened to arguments for and against
the proposed statute before voting either to enact or reject it.62
The author of the statute would argue the merits of his proposed
statute before the nomothetai, while elected advocates, or
sundikoi, argued against the enactment of the new law. 63 At the
close of the "trial", the nomothetai voted by hand to decide whether
or not to enact the new law. 64
Any Athenian citizen had the right to propose new legislation
and to speak during the Assembly meeting. In fact, the hallmark
of the Assembly was the doctrine of isegoria, or "equality of
speech," which permitted any Athenian to take to the speaker's
platform and join the legislative debate. 65 Due to this egalitarian
nature of the Assembly, certain gifted orators, such as
Demosthenes, were able to gain influence over their fellow citizens
on the strength of their rhetorical skills and, as a result, came to
hold political power in the city.
59. DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSIcAL ATHENS 44-45
(Cornell University Press 1978).
60. Id. at 48-49; see also HANSEN, supra note 55, at 167 (setting the number
of citizens in the nomothetai at 1001).
61. DEMOSTHENES, AGAINST MEIDIAS, ANDROTION, ARISTOCRATES,
TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON 385-89 (J.H. Vince trans., Loeb Classical Library
1935) (Dem.24.21-26); see also HANSEN, supra note 55, at 169 (explaining the
framework for passing legislation).
62. HANSEN, supra note 55, at 169.
63. Id.
64. Id. According to both the so-called Review Law and the Repeal Law,
the procedure for enacting new statutes could proceed along two paths.
Mogens Hansen, Athenian Nomothesia, 26 GREEK, ROMAN & BYZ. STUD. 345
n.3 and accompanying text (1985). Both paths required that the proposal of a
new statute always be accompanied by the simultaneous repeal of a standing
law, thus resulting in a contest between the two laws. HANSEN, supra note 55,
at 166. The Review Law allowed an individual to propose a new statute
during the annual review of the law code conducted in the Assembly. Id.
During the review, which took place every year in the first meeting of the
Assembly, new proposals were accepted to replace any challenged law. Id.
The Repeal Law, on the other hand, allowed a citizen to propose a new law on
his own volition at any time during the year. Id.
65. See HANSEN, supra note 55, at 141-50 (detailing the Assembly
procedure).
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2. The Council
The Council, or boule, was composed of 500 citizens (fifty from
each of the ten Athenian tribes) who were selected by lot to serve
for one year.66  The representatives-prytaneis--of each tribe
would take turns serving as the executive committee of the
Council for a one-month period (the Athenian calendar containing
ten months).67 At the end of the month, the representatives of
another tribe would assume the duties of this executive
committee. 68 The committee would meet daily, with the exception
of holidays, to issue decrees, prepare for upcoming meetings of the
Assembly, and conduct other state business. 69  The Council's
primary function was preparing the agenda for the Assembly,
although it also handled a number of other ministerial duties,
including overseeing minor military matters and issuing
regulations regarding religious festivals.7 0
3. The Magistrates
A significant number of magistrates of various types were
also needed to run the day-to-day operations of the city. 71 The
total number of magistrates reached approximately 700 as the
population of Athens peaked in the fourth century.7 2 The elected
generals-strategoi-were the magistrates with the greatest
political power in the fourth century, while the nine archons were
the magistrates charged with primarily judicial functions, such as
receiving complaints, holding preliminary hearings, and
overseeing trials.7 3 However, recent studies show that despite the
integral role they played in the operation of the judicial system,
the archons appeared to exert little influence over the outcome of
the trials and instead served a more bureaucratic purpose.7 4 The
other magistrates carried out various other tasks that required
oversight in the bustling city, such as regulating the marketplace,
maintaining public infrastructure, managing the city finances,
commanding the armed forces, and organizing religious festivals. 75
66. Id. at 246-48.
67. Id. at 250.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 250-51.
70. Id. at 256-60.
71. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 255-57 (identifying these magistrates
as the nine archons, a group that consisted of the King Archon, the
Eponymous Archon (who gave his name to the year of his term), the
Polemarch, and six others referred to as thesmothetai).
72. HANSEN, supra note 55, at 240.
73. Id. at 190, 233-34; see also ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 255-57.
74. See, e.g., Edward M. Harris, Open Texture in Athenian Law, 3 DIKE 27,
75-76 (2000) (discussing how magistrate judges were fearful of the
ramifications of their decisions and instead focused on procedural matters).
75. HANSEN, supra note 55, at 243.
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Although magistrates were generally selected by lot, the
Athenians held elections to fill those magistracies that required
special skills, such as the office of general.76
4. The Courts
The heart of the ancient Athenian legal system was the
People's Courts, or dikasteria, where disputes were resolved by
massive juries of at least 200 Athenian citizens-which number
climbed to 500 for public cases and could, in some cases, reach into
the thousands. 77 In addition to the large juries, one of the most
distinctive features of the Athenian judicial system was that the
litigants represented themselves in court.78 This meant that there
were no lawyers in Athens per se, although there was a thriving
black market of speechwriters (or logographers), who were
knowledgeable about the law and legal rhetoric, and who could be
hired by litigants to write a speech for a fee-which would then be
delivered by the litigant in court. 79
Athenian trials proceeded with great efficiency, lasting no
longer than a day.80 On the morning of the trial, the jurors
(dikastes) were selected for duty, assigned to a particular
courtroom, and seated through a complex procedure that ensured
the random seating of each juror in order to prevent bribery or the
stacking of juries.81 After the jury was seated, the litigants were
introduced and the court secretary (grammateus) read the
complaint to the jury.8 2 In addition to the court secretary, the
court personnel consisted of only a magistrate, who oversaw the
proceedings to ensure that proper procedure was followed, but
otherwise took no active part in the trial.8 3
After the complaint was read, the plaintiff stood up before the
jury and delivered a speech calling for the conviction of the
defendant. Following the plaintiffs speech, the defendant rose to
deliver a speech in his defense. Each litigant had a limited
amount of time to speak which was measured by a water clock.8 4
At any time during the course of his speech, a litigant could ask
76. Id. at 239-40.
77. MACDOWELL, supra note 59, at 36-40.
78. Id. at 249.
79. S.C. TODD, THE SHAPE OF ATHENIAN LAw 95-96 (Clarendon Press
Oxford 1993). Although representing oneself in court was certainly the
general rule in Athens, there were occasions where a litigant could ask a
supporter (sunegoroi) to speak on his behalf (however, the use of sunegoroi
may have required the permission of the jurors). Id. at 94.
80. MACDOWELL, supra note 59, at 249.
81. BOEGEHOLD, supra note 49, at 32.
82. A.R.W. HARRISON, THE LAW OF ATHENS 156 (2d ed. Oxford University
Press 1971) (1968).
83. TODD, supra note 79, at 78-79.
84. MACDOWELL, supra note 59, at 249.
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the secretary to read a document aloud to the jury. 5  This
document might be a statute, a witness statement, an oracle, an
oath, or any other type of writing. After the litigants had spoken,
the jury voted by secret ballot to convict or acquit.8 6 One by one,
the jurors would drop their ballots into an urn, which would then
be counted on the spot.8 7 The vote of the majority carried the day
and the verdict was announced immediately.
If the jury voted to convict, the defendant was either subject
to the penalty established by law or, if no penalty was set, the jury
was required to assess a penalty.88 In the event that the jury had
to assess a penalty, this assessment took place immediately
following the announcement of the verdict. The jurors would
return to their seats to listen to another set of speeches in which
each litigant would propose a penalty that could range from a
small fine to execution. 89 The jury would then vote for a second
time to select either the plaintiffs proposed penalty or the
defendant's proposal.90 As before, the majority vote decided the
issue and the selected penalty was promptly imposed without the
possibility of appeal.9 1
C. The Athenian Constitution
Some scholars are likely to reject the idea that ancient Athens
had a constitution. These scholars would be right, if by
"constitution" they meant a single document that was superior to
any other legal norm, was entrenched (i.e., difficult to amend), and
not only established the organs of government with their
respective powers, but also enumerated the individual rights of
citizens-that is, the type of constitution that is found in the
United States and certain other modern democracies. Athens had
no such document. However, the concept of a constitution need
not be so narrowly defined. Some modern democracies, such as
Britain, Israel, and New Zealand, are said to have constitutions
even though these countries lack a single supreme document of the
type just described. 92 These countries are said to have unwritten
constitutions which nonetheless provide for stable governments
that are established by "political fact" or "convention," rather than
the written word, and protect civil liberties by way of the
85. BOEGEHOLD, supra note 49, at 34.
86. TODD, supra note 79, at 132-33.
87. Id.
88. MACDOWELL, supra note 59, at 253-54.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONS, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY (1993), reprinted in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 195,
199 (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, eds., Foundation Press 1999).
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legislature's respect for traditional legal principles rather than by
enshrinement in a supreme statute.93
Rather than attempting to shoehorn the Athenian
constitution into a modern classification, it makes more sense to
recognize it as a unique type of constitution that shares certain
features with modern written constitutions, while differing in
other ways. Stated briefly, ancient Athens had an unentrenched
constitution that was, at least partially, written. Instead of
employing a supreme document containing laws that trumped all
subsequent legislation, as is found in the United States, Germany,
and other modern democracies, Athens' constitution was composed
of the entire body of existing statutes (nomoi). This body of laws
operated as a supreme set of legal norms with which all
subsequent legislation had to conform. All new decrees
(psephismata) had to comply with the existing statutes pursuant
to a law enacted in 403 B.C., which stated, "no decree of the
Council or the people was superior to any statute."94 Similarly,
new statutes had to conform to the standing laws because they
could be challenged as unconstitutional if they were found to be
"contrary to any existing statute."95 Athens can be said to have
had a written constitution because the laws that made up the
supreme set of legal norms were either inscribed on stone stelae
erected throughout the city or were painted onto wooden boards
and kept at the state archive.96
The argument can also be made that the Athenians had an
unwritten constitution-similar to the unwritten constitutions of
the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Israel-because Athens
had no supreme document like the United States Constitution. It
is true that the Athenian system resembles that of the United
Kingdom where Acts of Parliament, rather than any single
supreme constitutional document, are the highest law of the
land.97 However, the constitution of the United Kingdom is viewed
as unwritten, in part, because Parliament's legislative power is not
prescribed by law, but simply exists as a "political fact."98 In this
93. JAMES T. MCHUGH, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS 50-53
(Peter Lang Publishing 2002).
94. 1 ANTIPHON & ANDOCIDES, MINOR ATTIC ORATORS 407 (K.J. Maidment
trans., Loeb Classical Library 1961) (1941) (And.1.87); DEMOSTHENES, supra
note 61, at 273-75 (Dem.23.86); RAPHAEL SEALEY, THE ATHENIAN REPUBLIC:
DEMOCRACY OR THE RULE OF LAW? 32-34 (Penn State Univ. Press 1987).
95. DEMOSTHENES AGAINST MEIDIAS, supra note 61, at 393 (Dem.24.33)
(translation modified by author).
96. James P. Sickinger, The Laws of Athens: Publication, Preservation,
Consultation, in THE LAW AND THE COURTS IN ANCIENT GREECE 93, 93-94
(Edward Harris & Lene Rubinstein eds., Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd. 2004).
97. Mark Elliott, United Kingdom: Bicameralism, Sovereignty, and the
Unwritten Constitution, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 370, 373 (2007).
98. Id.
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respect, the Athenian system more closely resembles a written
constitutional system since the legislative power of the Assembly
is enshrined in law, rather than being a mere political fact.99
Moreover, an Athenian law enacted in 403 B.C. states that
magistrates are to use "written laws" only, which indicates that
the Athenians rejected unwritten law.100  This being said,
constitutional systems can have both written and unwritten
elements, therefore, it can be difficult to classify a given
constitution as being one or the other. For example, some
commentators characterize the British constitution as both written
and unwritten.101 Some modern constitutional scholars argue that
the United States Constitution has unwritten elements that
emerge when judges apply certain ideals, rooted in tradition,
natural law, or other sources external to the four corners of the
Constitution. 102 Likewise, despite the Athenian focus on written
law, there is some evidence for the use of unwritten law in Athens,
whether based on notions of equity or on respect for fundamental
legal principles embodied by certain written statutes. 103
Although the Athenian constitution can be said to have been
written, it was an unentrenched written constitution because the
body of standing laws could be amended at any time by an act of
ordinary legislation-not unlike the British constitution.1 04
However, as illustrated below, the Athenians compensated for the
lack of procedural entrenchment by making efforts to respect the
fundamental principles that animated their law code, i.e., the
spirit of the law, in order to ensure that such principles would not
be abrogated by new legislation. This reliance on the respect for
the fundamental legal principles as a bulwark against the
violation of these principles, although perhaps weaker than
99. See supra Part III.B.1. (discussing the legislative process and its
underlying statutes).
100. 1 ANTIPHON & ANDOCIDES, supra note 94, at 407 (And.1.87).
101. See, e.g., MCHUGH, supra note 93, at 47 (noting that some
commentators characterize the British constitution as both written and
unwritten).
102. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 43 (Putnam 1978) (1890) (arguing that the presence of
unwritten elements affect interpretation of the United States Constitution);
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703, 706 (1975) (finding an unwritten constitution in "the courts' additional
role as the expounder of basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair
treatment, even when the content of these ideals is not expressed as a matter
of positive law in the written Constitution"); J. Richard Broughton, The
Jurisprudence of Tradition and Justice Scalia's Unwritten Constitution, 103
W. VA. L. REV. 19, 24 (2000) (finding an unwritten constitution in Justice
Scalia's use of tradition when interpreting the constitution).
103. See, e.g., RUDOLF HIRZEL, AGRAPHOS NOMOS (1900).
104. S.E. FINER ET. AL., COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS (1995), reprinted in,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 358, 360 (Foundation Press 1999).
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procedural protections, can nevertheless be effective-as
exemplified by the British parliament's similar respect for ancient
legal principles or "conventions."10 5
In the end, the bedrock of the Athenian legal system was a
written body of laws with which all new legislation had to conform,
just as the United States Constitution is a written set of norms
that trumps all non-conforming legislation. Like the Justices of
the Supreme Court, the Athenian jurors had to face the difficult
task of how to interpret the written text of their constitution as
well as the conundrum of how to protect the underlying principles
of their constitution when such protections were not explicitly
provided for by the written word.
D. Judicial Review in Athens
Judicial review in Athens took place by means of two actions:
the graphe paranomon and the graphe nomon me epitedeion
theinai (which can be literally translated as "action for illegality"
and "action for authoring an unfitting law," respectively). These
two actions prevented the Assembly from acting either illegally or
imprudently by allowing the courts to annul any Assembly decree
that ran contrary to standing law, while the graphe nomon me
epitedeion theinai permitted a similar review of new
statutes.10 6Like the Supreme Court, a jury in a graphe paranomon
or a graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai had the power to declare
a law "unconstitutional" and order its repeal. However, as
described below, the procedure for challenging the
constitutionality of a law in Athens differed from the procedure in
the United States in that the constitutionality of a new law was
not challenged in the context of existing litigation, but was instead
challenged in an action that could be brought by any citizen solely
for the purpose of challenging the constitutionality of the law.
The graphe paranomon and the graphe nomon me epitedeion
theinai followed the procedure typical of public actions in
Athens.10 7 Any citizen had a right to initiate an action and call for
105. MCHUGH, supra note 93, at 47, 50-51.
106. HANSEN, supra note 55, at 209; Sundahl, supra note 4, at 131. Others
have noted that the graphe paranomon was similar to judicial review in the
United States and other modern democracies. See, e.g., 1 ROBERT J. BONNER &
GERTRUDE SMITH, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FROM HOMER TO
ARISTOTLE 296-97 (University of Chicago Press 1930).
107. See, e.g., MACDOWELL, supra note 59, at 56-57 (explaining the
differences between graphe paranomon and graphe nomon me epitedeion
theinai). Unlike modern legal systems, the Athenian system was not
bifurcated into civil and criminal segments. Id. Instead, the available actions
were of two general types: either a dike, frequently described as a "private
action," or a graphe, commonly translated as a "public action." Id. Examples
of available actions include a dike blabes (an action for injury), a dike
kakegorias (an action for slander), a graphe paranomon (an action challenging
[42:463
HeinOnline  -- 42 J. Marshall L. Rev. 484 2008-2009
2009] A Comparative Perspective on the Originalism Debate 485
a trial to test the constitutionality of a new statute or decree. Both
actions were heard before a jury of at least 500 citizens and, as
was true in all Athenian trials, the litigants represented
themselves in court. 08 This meant that the citizen who challenged
the statute would speak for the prosecution, while the citizen who
authored the challenged statute would personally mount the
defense. The trial would last approximately six hours, with one-
third of the time being allotted to the prosecution's speech, one-
third to the defense, and, in the event of a finding of
unconstitutionality, the final third to the assessment of the
penalty. 0 9 After the litigants delivered their speeches, the jury
voted either to annul the challenged piece of legislation or to let it
stand.110 If the jury voted to annul the new legislation, the
defendant was in most cases subject to a penalty assessed by the
jury.1'
The arguments made by the plaintiff in a graphe paranomon
and a graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai can be generally divided
into two broad categories: legal arguments and political
arguments. Legal arguments were designed to prove that the
challenged statute or decree in some way violated or was
inconsistent with standing law. 112  These arguments were
commonly presented in the opening section of the speech before
the plaintiff launched into the political arguments. When making
these legal arguments, a plaintiff generally had to show that the
defendant failed to follow proper legislative procedure or that the
text of the statute or decree somehow violated a standing law. For
example, Demosthenes alleged that Timocrates' law was invalid
a proposed law as unconstitutional), and a graphe asebeias (an action for
impiety). Id. Rather than the public/private dichotomy, a clearer distinction
between the two types of actions is procedural in nature: the principal
difference being that any citizen could bring a graphe, even if the plaintiff had
no involvement with the case, whereas only a victim could instigate a dike. Id.
at 57-58.
108. TODD, supra note 79, at 83, 92. In some cases, the number of jurors
increased to one thousand or more. Id. at 83.
109. MACDOWELL, supra note 59, at 249.
110. TODD, supra note 79, at 132-33.
111. See, e.g., DEMOSTHENES, AGAINST MEIDIAS, supra note 61, at 281
(Dem.23.94); DEMOSTHENES, OLYNTHIACS, PHILIPPICS, MINOR PUBLIC
SPEECHES, SPEECH AGAINST LEPTINES (J.H. Vince trans., Loeb Classical
Library 1930) (Dem.20.1); TODD, supra note 79, at 134 (discussing how the
jury decided on a fine).
112. DEMOSTHENES, supra note 61, at 393 (Dem.24.33) (translation modified
by author). The Repeal Law allowed for a new statute to be challenged as
unconstitutional if the statute were "contrary to any established law." Id.
Likewise, the authority for challenging a new decree on the basis that it
contradicted an existing statute can be found in the statute enacted in 403
B.C. stating that "no decree, whether of the Council or Assembly, shall
override a statute." 1 ANTIPHON & ANDOCIDES, supra note 94, at 407
(And.1.87) (translation modified by author).
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because it was directed at a particular individual in contravention
of the statutory prohibition of ad hominem legislation.113 Legal
arguments of unconstitutionality could also be based on the
allegation that the challenged law or decree violated certain broad
principles that were embodied by one or more standing laws (a
category of arguments referred to hereinafter as "arguments of
underlying principle"). When making this argument, the plaintiff
would first extract a general legal principle from a standing law
and then argue that the challenged law somehow offends this
principle. For example, in the following passage from his speech
against Leptines, Demosthenes explains that Solon's testamentary
law, which allowed a man to leave his property to an heir of his
choice, engendered healthy competition among relatives to gain
the favor of the testator, which, in turn, brought out their best
qualities:
If Solon made a law that every man could grant his property to
whomsoever he pleased [so] that by making the prize open to all he
might excite a rivalry in doing good one to another; and if you have
proposed a law that the people shall not be permitted to bestow on
any man any part of what is their own, how can you be said to have
read or understood the laws of Solon?114
In this passage, Demosthenes first extracts a principle from
the Solon's long-standing testamentary law which, in short, is the
principle that a law should offer incentives to promote good
behavior. He then points out that Leptines' proposed law, which
eliminated exemptions from certain liturgical taxes that had been
granted to benefactors of Athens, was contrary to this principle
because, by extinguishing rewards for good behavior, the law
removed incentives that motivated benefactors." 5 As discussed in
greater detail below, these arguments of underlying principle
played a significant role in the development of Athens' living
113. DEMOSTHENES, AGAINST MEIDIAS, supra note 61, at 411 (Dem.24.59).
This prohibition against ad hominem legislation parallels the constitutional
ban on bills of attainder. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. In an example of a
plaintiff alleging the violation of proper legislative procedure, Demosthenes
accuses Timocrates of repeatedly violating the legislative procedures laid out
in the Review Law and the Repeal Law. DEMOSTHENES, AGAINST MEIDIAS,
supra note 61, at 387-89 (Dem.24.26-38). In the first of these allegations,
Demosthenes points out that Timocrates failed to display the text of his
proposed statute for public perusal prior to its enactment. Id. He then argues
that when Timocrates' law was ratified the decree which set forth the agenda
for the nomothetai did not include a hearing on Timocrates' law. Id. at 391
(Dem.24.29). Finally, Demosthenes alleges that Timocrates neglected to
follow proper procedure by failing to repeal all contradictory laws prior to
making his proposal. Id. at 397 (Dem.24.38).
114. DEMOSTHENES, OLYNTHIACS, supra note 111, at 559-61 (Dem.20.102-
03).
115. Id.
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constitution.
On the other hand, political arguments of unconstitutionality
were comprised of all arguments that were not legal in nature. In
their most typical incarnation, political arguments alleged that the
challenged law was detrimental to Athens. 116 Political arguments
also included those arguments designed to disparage the opponent
by means of either political or personal attacks. 1 7 Although the
relative importance of legal and political arguments in the minds
of the jurors has been extensively debated, it is probably fair to say
that in order to be successful in either a graphe paranomon or
graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai, the plaintiff would have to
make convincing arguments of both a legal and political nature.
118
Of the hundreds of speeches presumably delivered during
the fourth century in the course of graphe paranomon or graphe
nomon me epitedeion theinai trials, only seven have been
preserved to the present day. These seven speeches include
Aeschines' speech Against Ctesiphon (Aeschin.3), Demosthenes'
speech On the Crown (Dem.18), Demosthenes' speech Against
Androtion (Dem.22), Demosthenes' speech Against Aristrocrates
(Dem.23), and Hypereides' speech Against Philippides (Hyp.2).
Two of the speeches (Dem.20 and Dem.24) were delivered in
graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai trials while the other five
were written for graphe paranomon trials. All of the speeches
apart from Demosthenes' oration On the Crown were written for
the prosecution. Unfortunately, Hypereides' speech comes down to
us in only fragmentary condition. The following section will show
how these speeches, despite their limited number, still enable us
to observe in considerable detail how judicial review worked in
Athens.
IV. THE LIVING CONSTITUTION OF THE ATHENIANS
The following analysis of the Athenian legal system reveals a
constitution that had a great degree of interpretational flexibility.
This flexibility enabled the Athenians to protect the fundamental
principles of their constitution when the laws did not provide
explicit protection for these principles and allowed the constitution
to evolve with the changing values of a dynamic society. In other
words, the Athenians can be said to have had a "living
constitution." The Athenian constitution achieved this flexibility
116. DEMOSTHENES, AGAINST MEIDIAS supra note 61, at 393 (Dem.24.33).
Such arguments of detriment could serve as grounds for bringing a graphe
nomon me epitedeion theinai as is clearly expressed in the Repeal Law which
forbids the proposal of statutes that were "disadvantageous to the Athenian
democracy." Id.
117. Harvey Yunis, Law, Politics and the graphe paranomon in Fourth-
Century Athens, 29 GREEK, ROMAN & BYZ. STUD. 361, 361-62 (1988).
118. Id. at 364.
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for two reasons. First, Athenian jurors enjoyed broad
interpretational discretion due to the "open texture" of the legal
system. This open texture was a product of (i) the vague wording
of Athenian statutes and (ii) certain features of the trial system
that increased juror discretion such as the lack of binding
precedent, the lack of published opinions, and the permission
granted to jurors to apply equity where the law was not clear.
Second, the flexibility of the Athenian constitution was a result of
the ability of litigants to transcend the plain language of the
Athenian statutes and promote the underlying principles of their
constitution through the creative use of arguments that relied on
implicit constitutional principles rather than the statutory text.
Taken together, these aspects of Athenian law created a living
constitution that protected the fundamental principles embodied
by the standing laws.
A. The "Open Texture" of Athenian Law
When first empanelled, Athenian jurors took the Dikastic
Oath which required the jurors to issue a verdict "in accordance
with the statutes of Athens."'1 9 Although this oath required that
jurors apply the law, they still enjoyed a great deal of discretion in
the interpretation of those laws. Edward Harris has written
extensively about this interpretational flexibility, or "open
texture," of Athenian law and has shown how it resulted from the
vague language of Athenian statutes coupled with the lack of any
official canons of statutory interpretation. 120  According to
119. DEMOSTHENES, supra note 61, at 469 (Dem.24.149) (translation
modified by author). The purported text of the entire Dikastic Oath is
preserved in Demosthenes' speech Against Timocrates. Id.; see also Max
FrAnkel, Der attische Heliasteneid, 13 HERMES 452 (1878) (discussing the
Dikastic Oath); 2 R.J. BONNER & G. SMITH, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
FROM HOMER TO ARISTOTLE 152-54 (1938) (discussing various interpretations
of the validity of the oath in Demosthenes and attempts to reconstruct the
"true" oath); David C. Mirhady, The Dikasts' Oath and the Question of Fact, in
HORKOS: THE OATH IN GREEK SOCIETY 48-59 (Alan H. Sommerstein & Judith
Fletcher eds., 2007).
120. See Harris, supra note 74; see also Edward Harris, More Thoughts on
Open Texture in Athenian Law, in NOMOS ESTUDOS SOBRE DIREITO ANTIGO 241
(D. Leao, D. Rosetti & M. Fialho eds., 2004). Some scholars do not recognize
the "open texture" of the Athenian legal system and argue instead that
Athenian jurors adhered strictly to the dictates of the applicable statutes in an
almost mechanical fashion, thus allowing little room for interpretation of the
law or the consideration of non-legal arguments (regarding character,
expediency, etc.). See, e.g., HARALD MEYER-LAURIN, GESETZ UND BILLIGKEIT
IM ATTISCHEN PROZESS (1965); Joachim Meinecke, Gesetzesinterpretation und
Gesetzesanwendung im Attischen Zivilprozess, 3 REV. INT'L DES DROITS DE
L'ANTIQUIT9 275 (1971). On the other end of the spectrum, some scholars
believe that law was only a subsidiary factor in the mind of the typical
Athenian juror and that Athenians could even ignore the law if they chose to
do so. See, e.g., TODD, supra note 79, at 64-66 (stating that Athenian jurors
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Aristotle, some Athenians believed that the vague language of
their laws was a deliberate innovation of Solon, which he
embraced "in order that the final decision might be in the hands of
the people."'121 In this sense, the vague language of the Athenian
laws can be compared to the "majestic generalities" of the United
States Constitution, which has been heralded as an innovation of
the Framers that allowed for the broad protection of civil liberties
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 122
A prime example of the vague laws that populated the
Athenian legal code is the law that provided a cause of action
against anyone who committed an act of hubris.123 Although
hubris in its colloquial sense suggests an act involving great
arrogance, it was used in this statute to describe a type of physical
assault that was more severe that simply battery (aikeias).124
However, the exact meaning of hubris is not explicit in the statute,
thus leaving it to the Athenian jurors to decide whether an act of
violence was a mere battery or qualified as a more serious act of
hubris. In the fourth century cases dealing with hubris, we see the
emergence of an understanding that hubris requires, in addition to
a physical attack, the humiliation of the victim-but this is not
required by the letter of the law, thus indicating an evolution of
the definition as Athenian society and values changed.
Aware of the jurors' freedom to interpret the laws as they saw
fit, litigants engaged in kaleidoscopic rhetorical manipulation of
the laws. Aristotle promoted this manipulation of the law in his
Rhetoric when he wrote that "[i]f the meaning of the law is
equivocal, we must turn it about, and see in which way it is to be
placed more emphasis on the procedure of the trial and less emphasis on the
substance of the arguments). The truth is undoubtedly to be found somewhere
between these two camps. See Harris, supra note 74, at 33-34; see also
Arnaldo Biscardi, La gnome dikaiotate et l'Interpretation des Lois dans la
Grace Ancienne, 17 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 219 (1970);
MICHAEL HILLGRUBER, DIE ZEHNTE REDE DES LYSIAS: EINLEITUNG, TEXT UND
KOMMENTAR MIT EINEM ANHANG OBER DIE GESETZESINTERPRETATIONEN BEI
DEN ArrISCHEN REDNERN 105-20 (1988).
121. ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 216 (AristAth.9.2). Aristotle himself did
not agree with this theory. Id. Moreover, Solon did not author all of the
Athenian laws and therefore the generally vague nature of Athenian statutes
cannot be attributed entirely to Solon-although he may have set a standard
that was followed by subsequent legislators.
122. See, e.g., W Va. State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)
(describing the translation of the Bill of Rights into concrete restraints dealing
with newly emerging problems).
123. DEMOSTHENES, AGAINST MEIDIAS supra note 61, at 36-37 (Dem.21.47)
(translation modified by author). "If anyone commits an act of hubris against
any man, woman, or child, whether free or slave, or commits any unlawful act
against anyone of these, any Athenian who desires to do so, being qualified,
may indict him before the Thesmothetai." Id.
124. TODD, supra note 79, at 270.
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interpreted so as to suit the application of justice or expediency." 125
Some of the techniques of interpretation used by Athenian
litigants included (1) adhering to the plain language of the statute
and the ordinary meaning of the words,1 26 (2) relying on
precedent, 127 (3) interpreting a statute in accordance with
legislative intent, 128 (4) comparing the disputed statute with the
meaning of other statutes, 129 and (5) interpreting statutes in a
manner consistent with democratic ideals and Athenian values.130
Although one might expect that a legal system based on vague
laws without standardized methods of interpretation would lead to
judicial chaos, Harris has shown that Athenian laws were applied
in a surprisingly consistent manner due to the tendency of
Athenian juries to reject radical interpretations of a statute.3 1 In
other words, the Athenians appear to have maintained respect for
the law, while simultaneously taking advantage of the flexibility
that came with the law's open texture.
Other features of the Athenian legal system also contributed
to the open texture of the law by serving to expand the jurors'
discretionary powers. One such feature was the lack of binding
precedent. Although used with some frequency by litigants as a
guide to the interpretation and application of statutes, precedent
was not reliable and, in any event, was not binding on jurors. 132
Adriaan Lanni has shown that the use of precedent as a method of
ensuring the consistent interpretation of the law was, despite the
good intentions of the litigants and jurors, nothing more than a
"noble lie" since Athens had no system of recording the prior
verdicts of juries, let alone the reasoning underlying such
verdicts. 133  Even if the jurors' memory of recent cases was
125. ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE: "ART" OF RHETORIC 155 (John Henry Freese
trans., Loeb Classical Library 1975) (1926) (Arist.Rh.1.15.10); see also David
C. Mirhady, Aristotle on the Rhetoric of Law, 31 GREEK, ROMAN, & BYZ. STUD.
393 (1990); David C. Mirhady, Non-Technical Pisteis in Aristotle and
Anaximenes, 112 AMER. J. PHILOLOGY 5 (1991).
126. Harris, supra note 74, at 38, 42, 44, 55-56.
127. Id. at 38, 64, 71.
128. Id. at 50, 56-57, 61, 66, 73.
129. Id. at 65. For example, a litigant may argue that a given statute should
be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with other existing statutes (in
light of the presumption that the collection of Athenian statutes was free of
inconsistencies after its revision at the end of the fifth century). Id.
130. Id. at 66.
131. Id. at 78-79.
132. Adriaan Lanni, Precedent and Legal Reasoning in Ancient Athenian
Courts: A Noble Lie?, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 27, 46 (1999) (showing that
precedent was used in one-fifth of the extant Athenian courtroom speeches).
133. Id. at 51; but see Edward Harris, Did the Athenian Courts Attempt to
Achieve Consistency? Oral Tradition and Written Records in the Athenian
Administration of Justice, in POLITICS OF ORALITY 343 (Craig Cooper ed.,
2007) (arguing that precedent was effective in promoting the consistent
application of law).
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accurate, the cultural tendency to abide by prior interpretations of
the law was certainly less developed than the concept of stare
decisis that guides Supreme Court decisions-and which
occasionally even overshadows doctrine as the primary
consideration for deciding a case in a particular way.134 This
freedom from precedent made it far easier for Athenian juries to
abandon prior interpretations of a statute in favor of an
interpretation that was in line with current cultural values, thus
expanding the discretion of jurors and promoting the living
constitution. Of course, freedom from binding precedent has
distinct disadvantages as well, such as a lack of the predictability
and consistency in the law that is necessary to protect reasonable
expectations.1 35
The open texture of Athenian law was further facilitated by
the lack of published opinions. Written opinions would have been
an impossibility given the large number of jurors. Moreover, the
reasoning behind the votes of the jurors would have been diverse
and would have reflected each juror's own understanding of the
facts and interpretation of the law, as well as other motivations
peculiar to each juror. Ultimately, the absence of written opinions
allowed jurors greater freedom to adopt their own interpretation of
the law. Because a juror was not required to explain his vote, he
could apply the law in the manner that he personally felt was fair.
However, the lack of reasoned opinions brings all the ills of
unaccountability. First of all, a juror could cast a vote on any
basis whatsoever since nobody would ever know the reasons
behind his vote (nor even how he voted due to secret balloting).
Therefore, jurors could choose to ignore the law altogether-
although this would be a violation of the Dikastic Oath. Moreover,
this lack of reasoned opinions prevents the evolution of doctrine.
Doctrine evolves over time as jurists build on prior legal thought
by examining the application of legal principles in the context of a
variety of fact patterns.136 Because there were no archives of
written opinions, the Athenians could not effectively create
doctrine that would guide future courts in the proper application of
the law. 137
134. See Fried, supra note 47, at 1143 (explaining how in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter relied primarily
on precedent rather than doctrine when upholding Roe v. Wade "almost as if
the decision could not stand on its own and needed an apology").
135. Id. at 1156.
136. See supra note 47 (describing the difference between precedent and
doctrine).
137. See Edward Brunet & Jennifer J. Johnson, Substantive Fairness in
Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 459, 490 (2008) (examining the
difficulty in creating doctrine in the context of commercial arbitration where
arbitral awards are rarely reasoned); see also Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Arbitral
Injustice-Rethinking the Manifest Disregard Standard for Judicial Review of
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Athenian jurors were given further license to interpret
statutes broadly by a portion of the Dikastic Oath that required
jurors to apply equity-or, more literally, their "fairest judgment"
(gnome dikaiotate)-when the law did not clearly address the
matter at hand. 138 Demosthenes reminds the jurors of their duty
to apply equity in his speech Against Leptines:
Again, men of Athens, you must also consider well and carefully the
fact that you have come into court today, sworn to give your verdict
according to the laws, not of Sparta or Thebes, nor those of our
earliest ancestors, but those under which immunities were granted
to the men whom Leptines is now trying to rob by his law; and
where there are no statutes to guide you, you are sworn to decide
according to your fairest judgment. 139
Exactly how and when jurors were to apply equity is a matter
of debate among legal historians. Some scholars believe that
equity was to be applied only as a subsidiary guideline and only in
those situations where no law existed that addressed the issue at
stake. 140 Although this strict approach is supported by some
passages in Demosthenes, other scholars have taken a more
permissive view of the use of equity by the Athenian jurors and
argue that equity could be utilized by the jurors not only in those
cases where a lacuna existed in the law code, but also in the
interpretation of applicable statutes.14 ' For example, in his speech
Against Theomnestus, Demosthenes urges the jury not to apply the
law against slander, which prohibited the use of the word
"murderer," in an unreasonably strict fashion:
Well, it may be, gentlemen, that he will make no defense on these
points, but will state again to you what he had the boldness to say
before the arbitrator-that it is not a use of a forbidden word to say
that someone has killed his father, since the law does not prohibit
that, but does disallow the use of the word "murderer." For my part,
gentlemen, I hold that your concern is not with mere words but with
their meaning, and that you are all aware that those who have
Awards, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 283, 287 (2007) (discussing standards of
judicial review of arbitration awards).
138. DEMOSTHENES, OLYNTHIACS, supra note 111, at 569 (Dem.20.118);
DEMOSTHENES, AGAINST MEIDIAS, supra note 61, at 281-83 (Dem.23.96).
139. DEMOSTHENES, OLYNTHIACS, supra note 111, at 569 (Dem.20.118)
(emphasis added).
140. See, e.g., Hans Julius Wolff, Die Grundlagen des Griechishcen
Vertragsrechts, 74 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG FOR
RECHTSGESCHICHTE 26, 34 (1957); HANS JULIUS WOLFF, GEWOHNHEITSRECHT
UND GESETZESRECHT IN DER GRIECHISCHEN RECHTSAUFFASSUNG 18 (1962);
MEYER-LAURIN, supra note 120, at 28-31.
141. See Biscardi, supra note 120, at 219-20; UGO E. PAOLI, STUDI SUL
PROCESSO ATTICO 11, 33 (1933). Some have also argued that jurors applied
equity when determining which of two conflicting laws should govern an issue.
Biscardi, supra note 120, at 219-20.
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killed someone are murderers, and that those who are murderers
have killed someone. For it was too much of a task for the lawgiver
to write all the words that have the same effect, but by mentioning
one he showed his meaning in regard to them all.142
Professor Paoli sees in this passage an appeal to the jurors'
sense of justice in the interpretation of the law. 143 And in light of
this passage, and others like it, Paoli argues that equity operated
as a sort of "safety valve" (soupape de sz2rete) in the Athenian
courtroom to ensure a just and reasonable outcome when the strict
application of the laws might otherwise produce an unfair
result.1 44  When considered in the context of the actions for
unconstitutionality, this use of equity as a factor in the application
of the laws may have been one of the reasons that we observe
Athenian litigants moving beyond the literal language of the
standing laws and making arguments of unconstitutionality based
on underlying principles when the literal language provided
insufficient protection of these principles-a phenomenon that is
explored in greater detail in the following section.
B. Arguments of Underlying Principle in Actions of
Unconstitutionality
The ancient Athenians would have frequently found
themselves facing new legislation that was thought to run
contrary to a fundamental legal principle that was not explicitly
stated in the text of the standing laws. This scenario was
precisely the situation faced by the Supreme Court in Brown,
Gitlow, Katz, Griswold, and Roe. As we know, the Supreme Court
responded in each of these cases by looking beyond the plain
language of the Constitution and basing its decision on principles
that are implicit in the document. As shown in this section, the
Athenians appear to have relied on such arguments of underlying
principle in very much the same way.
The Athenians had a great need to rely on arguments of
underlying principle because, unlike our Constitution, the body of
Athenian laws generally did not contain broad and abstract
provisions requiring the preservation of legal rights, such as the
right to trial, the right of free speech, and the freedom of
religion.1 45 Instead, the legal principles that were fundamental to
the Athenian democracy were woven into laws that address
142. LYSIAS, LYSIAS 201 (W.R.M. Lamb trans., Loeb Classical Library 1930)
(Lys. 10.6-7).
143. Biscardi, supra note 120, at 231.
144. Id. at 232.
145. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (explaining that the
Athenian legal system included only a few statutes that provided broad
protections, such as the Athenian law prohibiting ad hominem legislation of
any type).
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specific situations. For example, although there was no statute
proclaiming the basic right of the accused to seek a trial, this legal
principle, which was clearly valued highly by the Athenians, was
incorporated into various fact-specific laws, such as Dracon's
homicide law (which states that in cases of intentional homicide
the perpetrator had a right to trial before the Council of the
Areopagus). 146 This lack of statutes providing broad protection for
fundamental legal principles made it difficult for the Athenians to
preserve and promote these principles. If a new decree was
enacted that violated a fundamental principle without
contravening a specific law, it would have been difficult for the
Athenians to challenge the decree successfully unless jurors
readily accepted the type of arguments of underlying principle
described above in Section III.d. As shown below, the Athenians
did in fact make use of arguments of underlying principle and did
so in a highly creative manner that would have helped them
protect the fundamental principles of their democracy (although as
will be seen in the following analysis, not all of the surviving
examples of this type of argumentation involve the protection of
civil rights). A survey of the seven extant speeches delivered in
actions for unconstitutionality revealed twenty-one passages
where the speaker either uses the underlying principles of a
statute for purposes of interpretation or argues that a new statute
or decree is unconstitutional because it violates certain underlying
principles embodied in the standing laws. 147  One of these
passages, from Demosthenes' speech Against Leptines, has already
been discussed above in Section III.d. The following sections
explore the other vivid examples of such arguments.
1. The Action against Ctesiphon's Decree
The most famous examples of the use of arguments of
underlying principle in statutory interpretation are found in the
two speeches that were delivered in the action for
unconstitutionality brought by Aeschines against a decree
146. DEMOSTHENES, AGAINST MEIDIAS, supra note 61, at 227 (Dem.23.22).
147. The following passages contain arguments based on the underlying
principles of a standing law: AESCHINES, THE SPEECHES OF AESCHINES 341-43
(Charles Darwin Adams trans., Loeb Classical Library 1919) (Aeschin.3.43-
44); DEMOSTHENES, DE CORONA AND DE FALSA LEGATIONE 97-101 (C.A. Vince
& J.H. Vince trans., Loeb Classical Library 1953) (Dem.18.120-22);
DEMOSTHENES, OLYNTHIACS, supra note 111, at 559-61 (Dem.20.102, 104); id.
at 561 (Dem.20.104); id. at 581 (Dem.20.135); id. at 595-97 (Dem.20.158);
DEMOSTHENES, AGAINST MEIDIAS, supra note 61, at 227 (Dem.23.22); id. at
229 (Dem.23.26); id. at 231 (Dem.23.28); id. at 233 (Dem.23.31); id. at 245
(Dem.23.50); id. at 245-47 (Dem.23.51); id. at 259-61 (Dem.23.67-69); id. at
263 (Dem.23.71); id. at 265 (Dem.23.74); id. at 267 (Dem.23.76); id. at 267-69
(Dem.23.77-78); id. at 269-71 (Dem.23.80); id. at 271 (Dem.23.82); id. at 403-
405 (Dem.24.49).
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authored by Ctesiphon, a political ally of Demosthenes, that called
for Demosthenes' honorary crowning in the Theater of Dionysus.
Aeschines delivered the speech for the prosecution, while
Demosthenes delivered his rhetorical masterpiece On the Crown in
defense of Ctesiphon's decree. 148 Aeschines and Demosthenes
were the most powerful politicians in Athens at the time, being at
the helm of the pro-Macedonian and anti-Macedonian parties,
respectively, and they were bitter rivals.149
One of the primary legal issues in the case was whether the
laws permitted Demosthenes to be crowned in the theater--or
whether he had to be crowned at the Pnyx (an outdoor
amphitheater where the Assembly met) during a meeting of the
Assembly. 15 0  If his crowning in the theater was illegal,
Ctesiphon's decree would be found unconstitutional. In the course
of the trial, two statutes are presented to the jury regarding the
permissibility of the crowning in the theater. One statute required
all crowns voted by the Assembly to be presented to the recipient
at the Pnyx, while the other statute stated that crowns could not
be presented to a recipient at the Theater of Dionysus "unless the
people vote."'1 51 Putting aside questions about the authenticity of
the laws as they were presented to the jury (which has itself
generated scholarship), it is interesting to observe how both
litigants use arguments of underlying principle to support their
own interpretation of these laws.1 52
Aeschines argues that the law allowing for crowning in the
theater upon the vote of the people does not apply to crowns voted
by the Assembly to Athenian citizens. In support of this
interpretation, he argues that the author of the statute did not
intend to change the law requiring the crowning to take place at
the Pnyx whenever the Assembly bestowed a crown, but instead
merely intended to prohibit other crowns, which were granted by a
tribe or neighborhood association, from being proclaimed in the
theater.153  According to Aeschines, the author's rationale in
drafting this law was to prevent the recipients of these lesser
crowns granted by a tribe or neighborhood from receiving greater
adulation from the theater crowds than those more deserving
benefactors who were crowned by the Assembly would receive from
148. DEMOSTHENES, DE CORONA, supra note 147, at 97-101 (Dem.18.120-22);
AESCHINES, supra note 147, at 305-511 (Aeschin.3). This pair of speeches is
the only instance in the extant corpus of Athenian courtroom speeches where
both the prosecution and the defense speeches of a single action have survived.
149. William E. Gwatkin, THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS IN AISCHINES' AGAINST
KTESIPHON AND DEMOSTHENES'ON THE CROWN, 26 HESPERIA 129, 129 (1957).
150. AESCHINES, supra note 147, at 335-37 (Aeschin.3.32-37).
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Gwatkin, supra note 149, at 139-41.
153. AESCHINES, supra note 147, at 341-43 (Aeschin.3.43).
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the citizens gathered at the Pnyx.154 Aeschines' interpretation of
the law here is clearly driven not by the statutory language, but
rather by the underlying purpose of the law, which he identifies by
examining the intent of the lawgiver.
Demosthenes proposes a very different interpretation of the
statute-however, like Aeschines, he bases his interpretation on
what he believes was the underlying principle that motivated the
enactment of the statute.155 In his speech, Demosthenes rejects
Aeschines' argument that the law prohibiting crowning in the
theater did not apply to crowns granted by the Assembly. He
argues instead that the law does apply to such crownings and
allows for their proclamation in the theater provided that the
Assembly votes for proclamation in the theater.156 In support of
this interpretation, Demosthenes explains that the state enacted
the law allowing for the proclamation of crowns in the theater with
the approval of the Assembly so that the recipient could enjoy the
adulation of the theater audience, which would serve as an
incentive for everyone in the audience to seek their own crowning
through beneficent works:
But, really now, are you so unintelligent and blind, Aeschines, that
you are incapable of reflecting that a crown is equally gratifying to
the person crowned wheresoever it is proclaimed, but that the
proclamation is made in the Theatre merely for the sake of those by
whom it is conferred? For the whole vast audience is stimulated to
do service to the commonwealth, and applauds the exhibition of
gratitude rather than the recipient; and that is the reason why the
state has enacted this statute. 157
Thus, Demosthenes is asking the jurors to interpret the law
in a way that promotes its core principle and purpose: to inspire
those citizens who witness a crowning in the theater to seek their
own crowning through good works. Demosthenes arrives at this
underlying purpose of the law by inquiring into the intent of the
legislator-who was, in this case, simply "the state," i.e., the body
of citizens who voted to enact the law.
The use of legislative intent by both Aeschines and
154. Id. at 343 (Aeschin.3.44).
155. That Demosthenes and Aeschines espouse different ideas about the
intent of the lawgiver and the principle that motivated the legislation is not so
surprising. In fact, it is common even today for opposing sides to develop
different theories regarding the true intent of the lawgiver. See Gregory
Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original
Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 833-35 (2007)
(discussing how the Federalist Papers, which are now used to gain insight into
the original intent of the founders of the Constitution of the United States,
contain multiple conflicting arguments).
156. DEMOSTHENES, DE CORONA, supra note 147, at 97-99 (Dem.18.120).
157. Id. (emphasis added).
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Demosthenes to extract the underlying principles of the standing
laws is strikingly similar to the use of legislative intent by Justices
Stevens and Breyer in their Heller dissents described above.
158
Justice Stevens' dissent in Heller uses original intent to identify
the underlying principles of the Second Amendment by inquiring
into what the Framers intended to achieve when drafting the
Second Amendment. 15 9 Justice Stevens' focus on the intent of the
Framers is illustrated by the passage where he wrote that "the
Framers' single-minded focus in crafting the constitutional
guarantee 'to keep and bear arms' was on military uses of
firearms."160  He then argued that, in light of this intent, the
Amendment should be "read to secure to the people a right to use
and possess arms in conjunction with service in a well-regulated
militia."161
Although the task of accurately determining the intent of the
Framers often poses a significant challenge to the members of the
Supreme Court, an Athenian litigant would have faced an even
greater challenge in discovering the intent of the lawgiver. To
begin with, it was not clear who the author of a particular law
was. Moreover, there were no official legislative histories to
provide reliable information about the circumstances and purposes
of particular legislation. Nevertheless, the Athenians attempted
to reconstruct legislative intent by other means. First, litigants
could rely on the writings of Greek historians to gain an
understanding of legislative intent through historical context.i
62
Second, litigants could look to other literary sources for
information about a lawgiver's intent, such as Aristotle's
Constitution of the Athenians or even the poems written by Solon
158. See supra note 40 (discussing Justice Stevens' and Justice Breyer's
dissents in Heller).
159. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his critique of
Justice Stevens' "underlying principles" approach to the Second Amendment
in Heller, Prof. Barnett points out how Stevens relies on legislative intent
when identifying the principles underlying the Second Amendment:
[Scalia's] approach stands in sharp contrast to Justice John Paul
Stevens's dissenting opinion that largely focused on "original intent"-
the method that many historians employ to explain away the text of the
Second Amendment by placing its words in what they call a 'larger
context.' Although original-intent jurisprudence was discredited years
ago among constitutional law professors, that has not stopped
nonoriginalists from using "original intent"-or the original principles
"underlying" the text-to negate its original public meaning.
Barnett, supra note 39, at A13.
160. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2826 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 2831 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. For example, a litigant may have looked to Xenophon's description of
the Arginousae Affair in order to gain an understanding of subsequent legal
reforms that were undertaken to modify the radical democracy of the late fifth
century. Regarding the Arginousae Affair see supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
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himself about his legislative reforms. 163 Third, litigants could gain
information about the historical context, rationale, and intended
purpose of particular laws through oral tradition. For example, in
the excerpt from Aeschines' speech, we see Aeschines developing
legislative intent from the historical context of the law's enactment
which was likely to have been passed down orally (although the
accuracy of this historical context is difficult to verify and may
well be manufactured). Fourth, litigants frequently attempted to
discover the intended meaning of a statute by analyzing other
laws that provided clues as to the meaning of the statute at
hand.164 Fifth, litigants commonly based their claims regarding
legislative intent on the plain language of the statute. 165 Finally,
litigants were able, in some cases, to explain the intended meaning
and purpose of a law by recalling from personal experience the
Assembly debates and historical events that led to the enactment
of the particular law at issue. 166 In the end, the difficulty of
determining intent in no way prevented the Athenians from using
legislative intent in their arguments. This is evident in the fact
that in the seven speeches regarding the constitutionality of new
legislation, the litigants discuss legislative intent some twenty-six
times. 167
In sum, the speeches delivered by Aeschines and
Demosthenes in the action against Ctesiphon's decree show how
the statutes that made up the Athenian constitution could be
interpreted in light of their underlying principles and purpose-
rather than being interpreted strictly in accordance with the
163. For example, Solon wrote about his equal treatment of the rich and poor
during his tenure as a lawgiver in the following lines:
I stood casting my strong shield around both parties,
And allowed neither to triumph unjustly.
ARISTOTLE, supra note 4, at 217 (Arist.Ath. 12.1).
164. Aristotle recommends the practice of determining legislative intent by
examining other laws written by the same legislator. Id. at 237
(Arist.Ath.35.2).
165. See, e.g., AESCHINES, supra note 147, at 129 (Aeschin.1.160).
166. See, e.g., DEMOSTHENES, DE CORONA, supra note 147, at 83-85
(Dem. 18.102).
167. Legislative intent is discussed by the litigants in the following passages:
AESCHINES, supra note 147, at 323-35 (Aeschin.3.20-21); id. at 335
(Aeschin.3.33); id. at 343 (Aeschin.3.44); id. at 345 (Aeschin.3.47); id. at 445-
47 (Aeschin.3.175); DEMOSTHENES. DE CORONA, supra note 147, at 21-23
(Dem.18.6-7); id. at 83-85 (Dem.18.102); id. at 97-99 (Dem.18.120));
DEMOSTHENES, OLYNTHIACS, supra note 111, at 551 (Dem.20.89); id. at 559-61
(Dem.20.102-03); DEMOSTHENES, AGAINST MEIDIAS, supra note 61, at 163
(Dem.22.11); id. at 173 (Dem.22.25); id. at 175-77 (Dem.22.30-31); id. at 229
(Dem.23.25), id. at 231 (Dem.23.29); id. at 237-39 (Dem.23.37-39); id. at 249
(Dem.23.54); id. at 253 (Dem.23.60); id. at 265 (Dem.23.74); id. at 271-73
(Dem.23.83); id. at 273-75 (Dem.23.86); id. at 393-97 (Dem.24.34-38); id. at
399-401 (Dem.24.43-44); id. at 405-407 (Dem.24.51-53); id. at 441
(Dem.24.106); id. at 447 (Dem.24.115).
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statutory text.
2. The Action against Aristocrates'Decree
Demosthenes' speech Against Aristrocrates provides another
striking example of how the underlying principles of Athenian
statutes were used to prove the unconstitutionality of a new
decree. Demosthenes spoke for the prosecution in this action
against the constitutionality of a decree authored by a certain
political operative named Aristocrates. The challenged decree
made the mercenary general Charidemos inviolate by providing
for the seizure of anyone who might kill him:
If anyone kills Charidemos, he is liable to seizure and removal from
the territories of our allies. If any person or any city rescue him,
they shall be treated as persona non grata. 168
This decree had profound political repercussions because it would
have supported the policies of Eubulus, a political opponent of
Demosthenes, with respect to Thrace's effectiveness as a buffer
state between Greece and Macedonia.16 9
The speech against Aristocrates is distinctive in the way that
Demosthenes uses underlying principles to prove the
unconstitutionality of Aristocrates' decree. Instead of using
underlying principles merely as a tool of interpretation,
Demosthenes identifies the underlying principles of a number of
standing laws and then argues that Aristocrates' decree is
unconstitutional because it violates these principles (even though
the literal dictates of the statutes themselves are not violated).
In the speech, Demosthenes delivers twelve arguments
alleging the violation of legal principles that are implicit in the
standing laws. Demosthenes extracts these legal principles from
an array of homicide statutes and then proceeds to demonstrate
how Aristrocrates' decree offends these principles. For example,
Demosthenes has the law regarding intentional homicide read out
by the court secretary in order to illustrate how Aristrocrates'
decree offends one of the primary principles of Athenian law,
namely, the right of the accused to stand trial. 170 In the following
passage, Demosthenes impresses upon the jury how this right to
trial was a fundamental principle of Athenian law that is
demanded by "conscience" and the "religious feeling of the whole
city":
The legislator, while he presumes the killing, has nevertheless
168. DEMOSTHENES, AGAINST MEIDIAS, supra note 61, at 223, 279
(Dem.23.16, 91) (translation modified by author).
169. A. W. PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE, DEMOSTHENES AND THE LAST DAYS OF
GREEK FREEDOM 166-67 (1914).
170. DEMOSTHENES, AGAINST MEIDIAS, supra note 61, at 227-31 (Dem.23.22-
27)..
HeinOnline  -- 42 J. Marshall L. Rev. 499 2008-2009
The John Marshall Law Review
directed a judicial inquiry before specifying what is to be done to the
culprit, and thereby has shown a just respect, men of Athens, for the
religious feeling of the whole cityFalse He thought it scandalous to
give credit to such accusations, when made, without a trial; and he
conceived that, inasmuch as the avenging of the sufferer is in our
hands, we ought to be informed and satisfied by argument that the
accused is guilty, for then conscience permits us to inflict
punishment according to knowledge, but not before. 171
Although Demosthenes refers to conscience and religion, the true
source of this right to trial is found in the written homicide law.
Demosthenes is therefore attempting here to protect a principle
that is implicit in a standing law.
In another argument of principle in the same speech,
Demosthenes explains how the standing laws do not permit the
maltreatment of murderers by vigilantes and then argues that
Aristocrates neglects this humanitarian principle by failing to
provide any safeguard against the potential physical abuse of
Charidemus' killer.172 Similarly, Demosthenes has the secretary
read the law that prohibits the pursuit of murderers who have fled
Athens and then proceeds to point out that Aristrocrates' decree
violates this principle by allowing for the seizure of Charidemus'
killer wherever he may be found, even if outside of Athens. 173
Later in the speech, Demosthenes argues that the decree also
violates "two principles of justice" (duo dikaia) embodied by the
existing homicide law that allowed for the arrest by a magistrate
of an exiled killer who returned to Athens.174 These two principles
are (1) that an exiled killer should only be arrested by a
magistrate (and should not be subject to citizen's arrest) and (2)
that such arrest should only be permitted if the killer returns to
Athens. 175  In contrast, the challenged decree rendered
Charidemus' killer subject to citizen's arrest and permits him to be
seized wherever he may be found, thus violating these two
principles.
Continuing this line of argument, Demosthenes has the court
secretary read the following statute, which permits the family of a
victim of violent homicide (which Demosthenes interprets as
intentional homicide) to take as hostages those people in whose
house the homicide occurred until they submit to trial themselves
or surrender the perpetrators:
If any man die a violent death, his kinsmen may take and hold
hostages in respect of such death, until they either submit to trial
for bloodguiltiness, or surrender the actual manslayers. This right is
171. Id.
172. Id. at 231 (Dem.23.28).
173. Id. at 241 (Dem.23.44).
174. Id. at 245-47 (Dem.23.51).
175. Id.
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limited to three hostages and no more. 176
After the statute is read out, Demosthenes argues that
Aristrocrates' decree fails to provide for a trial or even take into
account the possibility that the killing may be unintentional or
justifiable-thus ignoring two principles embodied by the
statute.177 Moreover, while the statute permits the family of the
victim to take as hostages those in whose house the homicide
occurred, Aristrocrates' decree ignores the complicity of such
people entirely.178 Furthermore, Demosthenes argues that the fact
that the challenged decree also punishes anyone who harbors
Charidemus' killer by rendering him persona non grata violates
the "universal law" that requires all men to receive fugitives with
hospitality.179 This reveals yet another type of argument of
principle that resembles the arguments made today about the role
of natural law in the meaning of the Constitution.1 80 The natural
law theory, which happened to have its roots in the writings of
Plato and Aristotle, imports into the Constitution principles that
emanate not from its text, but from other sources such as divine
commandment, reason, or universal custom.18 1  Similarly,
Demosthenes argues that the principle violated by Aristocrates'
decree did not arise from the Athenian statutes, but is drawn
instead from a "universal law" that is unwritten.
Finally, Demosthenes recites provisions from four different
laws that contain references to the perpetrator's motives in order
to illustrate the principle that a defendant's motives must always
be taken into account prior to punishment:
Observe, gentlemen, that this is a universal distinction: it does not
apply only to questions of homicide. "If a man strike another, giving
the first blow," says the law. The implication is that he is not guilty,
if the blow was defensive. "If a man revile another,"-"with
falsehoods," the law adds, implying that, if he speaks the truth, he is
justified. "If a man slay another with malice aforethought,"-
indicating that it is not the same thing if he does it unintentionally.
"If a man injures another with intention, wrongfully." Everywhere
we shall find that it is the motive that fixes the character of the
act.182
Demosthenes then points out that Aristrocrates' decree,
176. Id. at 271 (Dem.23.82
177. Id. at 273 (Dem.23.84).
178. Id. (Dem.23.85).
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Russell Kirk, Natural Law and the Constitution of the United
States, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1036 (1994) (discussing and defining
natural law in general).
181. Id.
182. DEMOSTHENES, AGAINST MEIDIAS, supra note 61, at 245 (Dem.23.50)
(emphasis added).
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which simply states "whoever kills Charidemos is liable to
seizure," fails to consider motive, thus rendering the decree a
violation of this legal principle as well. No longer is Demosthenes
simply looking to the underlying principles of a law as a guide to
interpreting that law, as seen in Aeschines' speech against
Ctesiphon. Demosthenes is instead extracting principles from
various parts of the law code and then arguing that Aristocrates'
decree violated these principles. This is a more liberal use of
underlying principle that parallels the reasoning used in Griswold
and Roe v. Wade where the statutes criminalizing the use of
contraceptives and abortion were deemed unconstitutional not
because they violated a specific provision of the Constitution, but
because they violated an implicit right to privacy that emanated
from various clauses of the Constitution.183
Although the actions against Ctesiphon's decree and
Aristocrates' decree provide the best examples of the use of
arguments of underlying principle, similar arguments are found in
other speeches as well. In fact, we find similar arguments of
unconstitutionality based on underlying principles in five of the
seven extant speeches delivered in actions for
unconstitutionality.18 4 We know, therefore, that such arguments
were presented with some frequency in the Athenian courtroom.
However, whether these arguments of underlying principle were
always successful is a different matter since, with the exception of
Aeschines' prosecution of Ctesiphon (which Aeschines lost), the
sources do not inform us about the outcome of the trials.
Nevertheless, the way in which Demosthenes and Aeschines-two
of the great legal experts of the day-relied on arguments of
principle in their speeches strongly suggests that such arguments
were likely to be accepted by the jurors as legitimate arguments
against the constitutionality of new legislation. Assuming that
this is the case, the Athenians can be said with some confidence to
have had a "living constitution" that was not impeded by the
narrow reading of the statutory text, but was instead implemented
in a manner that promoted the underlying principles of the law.
V. CONCLUSION: THE LESSONS OF ANCIENT ATHENS
Like the United States, ancient Athens struggled with the
183. See supra Section II (discussing the judicial approaches taken in both
Griswold and Roe).
184. The five other passages in the extant speeches that allege
unconstitutionality on the grounds that the challenged legislations violates
the "underlying principles" of a standing law include the following:
DEMOSTHENES, OLYNTHIACS, supra note 111, at 559-61 (Dem.20.102), 561
(Dem.20.104), 581 (Dem. 20.135), 595-97 (Dem.20.158); DEMOSTHENES,
AGAINST MEIDIAS, supra note 61, at 403-05 (Dem.24.49).
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question that lies at the core of the originalism debate: whether its
constitution should be interpreted narrowly in accordance with its
text or more broadly in a manner that implements its underlying
principles in light of current cultural values. As this Article has
shown, the Athenians were, in fact, able to interpret their
constitution in a way that protected the fundamental principles
embedded in their statutes and accommodated cultural shifts over
time, thus liberating themselves from the "dead hand" of the past.
This "living constitution" stemmed not only from the open texture
of Athenian laws and procedures, but also from the Athenians'
ability to use arguments of principle in creative ways to liberate
themselves from a strict reading of their statutes and implement
the ideals embodied by their constitution. This enabled the
Athenians to annul new laws that violated certain fundamental
rights, such as the right to trial, even if that right was not
explicitly expressed in a statute.
This is not to say that the Athenian system did not suffer
from serious flaws. Legislative intent was virtually impossible to
determine given the absence of written legislative histories, which,
in turn, made it difficult to determine the principles that
motivated particular laws. Even identifying the author of a
specific law was a challenge. Furthermore, the lack of reasoned
opinions left jurors unaccountable for their decisions, thus giving
them license to ignore the law altogether. The absence of a
developed concept of stare decisis also deprived Athens of one of
the steadying forces that counterbalances the radical tendencies of
the living constitution approach. All of these features of the
Athenian system contributed to its open texture, but also
threatened to reach dangerous extremes by granting too much
discretion to the jury. In short, the Athenian constitution ran the
risk of being overly susceptible to the whims of the jurors who
could ride roughshod over the dictates of law without suffering any
consequences.
Despite these flaws in the Athenian system, American jurists
should look at ancient Athens as a successful model of a democracy
with a "living constitution." While the disadvantages of the living
constitution approach may have been exacerbated in Athens due
to the reasons stated above, the United States has remedied the
shortcomings of the Athenian system and is therefore better able
to reap the benefits of a living constitution approach while
avoiding its excesses. For example, in contrast to the Athenian
jurors, the members of the Supreme Court have access to copious
historical documentation to assist them with the task of
identifying legislative intent and the principles underlying the
provisions of the Constitution. The Supreme Court also publishes
reasoned opinions that allow for the methodical evolution of
constitutional doctrine which serves as a steadying influence over
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the Court's decisions. And, finally, the Supreme Court is guided
by a strong concept of stare decisis which protects against radical
shifts in constitutional interpretation. With these safeguards in
place, the United States is protected from the dangers of excessive
interpretational discretion and can confidently embrace the living
constitution in order to protect the fundamental principles of the
Constitution-just as Demosthenes looked beyond the black-letter
law to ensure that the Athenian right to trial, among other
principles, would not be trampled by Aristocrates' ill-conceived
law.
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